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The Varying Views of Substance Use Disorder Based on Temporal Considerations: 
Preventative Sympathy v. Retroactive Condemnation 
The United States of America is experiencing a crisis of dramatic proportions in the form 
of substance use disorder (SUD). With the rates of substance use steadily increasing in large part 
due to the opioid crisis, society has been pressured to come up with a response to quell the 
devastating effects of SUD.1 According to the 2018 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the 
percentage of Americans age 18 and older with SUD increased from 7.6% in 2017 to 7.8% in 
2018.2  
The impact of SUD stretches beyond those who have the disorder and has been estimated 
as having an overall societal economic cost of $740 billion annually.3 This number is frightening 
enough without considering the detriments caused by SUD that cannot be numerically measured, 
such as its effect on personal relationships, missed opportunities and lost lives. With the advances 
in neuroscience and armed with scientific data, the country has been moving in the right direction 
by developing policy which seeks to alleviate the problem of SUD by providing health services 
for those with SUD.4 Yet, the percentage of Americans with SUD is still increasing and there 
remains work to be done.  
Perhaps the largest legislative step taken toward curbing the economic and social issues 
created by high rates of SUD in recent history is the expansion of the Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act’s heightened insurance parity requirements to small business and individual 
 
1 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., 2018 NAT’L SURV. OF DRUG USE & HEALTH at Table 
5.1B (2018) 
2 Id. 
3 Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Trends & Statistics, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics (last 
updated April, 2007) 
4 Amanda Flood, Substance Use Disorder Parity Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
Improvements Made, but Further Government Action Needed to Guarantee Full Parity in the Private Insurance 
Market, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 363, 364-365 (2015) 
plans by means of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).5 By expanding the 
number of insured Americans, the ACA took an important step toward ensuring healthcare for all, 
including care for SUD.6 In addition, the ACA set up a system requiring new individual and small 
business health insurance plans to cover a list of Essential Health Benefits.7 This list includes SUD 
services and therefore expands the number of Americans who are entitled to access to substance 
misuse treatment services through their health insurance.8  
While this step may prove to be helpful in tackling SUD, it is does not fully solve the issue. 
The existence of further loopholes regarding private health insurance remain within the statutory 
framework in the form of exemptions and exceptions within the ACA.9 If an individual suffering 
SUD is terminated from employment due to their SUD, certain provisions of the Consolidated 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA) could leave them vulnerable by preventing the extension 
of their health insurance coverage beyond termination.10 Additionally, public disability insurance 
through the Social Security framework still provides a hindrance to providing disability insurance 
for those afflicted with SUD due to portions of the Contract With America Advancement Act of 
1996 (CAAA).11 Reformation of the exemptions available under the Affordable Care Act, a 
modification of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) and amendments 
to the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996 would help to ensure that Americans  of 
all backgrounds suffering SUD of all backgrounds have access to rehabilitative healthcare services. 
 
5 Id. at 372 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 381-382 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 393 
10 29 U.S.C.A.§1161 (LEXIS through Pub. L. 116-77) 
11 Max Selver, Disability Benefits and Addiction: Resolving an Uncertain Burden, 91 N.Y.U.L. REV. 954, 957 
(2016) 
These amendments would also reconcile the view of SUD in the policies by eliminating any 
potential bias based on when the SUD becomes apparent. 
Throughout the article, the issues caused by SUD and the statutory structures mentioned 
above will be examined, in part, by following the story of John Doe. John Doe, despite his 
diagnosed Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD), is a diligent and effective employee 
at a small business. After a long day at the office, John is involved in a tragic car accident during 
his commute which renders him with chronic pain and an undiagnosed case of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). John’s doctor prescribes him with opioid-based painkillers to help subdue 
the pain following the accident. As a means of dealing with the resulting pain, as well as easing 
the mental turmoil John experiences since the crash, John continues to seek out and use opioids 
after his prescription runs out. While John is using the illegal opioids, his employer notices a 
decline in John’s performance due to John appearing to be distracted and distant. While John does 
not use opioids during work hours, he finds his PTSD severely reduces his ability to be productive. 
The boss subsequently discovers John is using opioids illegally outside of the workplace and fires 
John. John then attempts to find some alternative method of obtaining both medical care, and 
income. John attempts to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) due to his PTSD. 
 This article examines the potential reconciliation of the principles espoused in the 
expansion of SUD parity laws in private insurance regulation with public aid available through 
SSDI. In Part I, this essay paper details the neuroscience and statistics that support the provision 
of health services for SUD. Part II reveals the legal history surrounding health insurance, private 
and public, as it relates to SUD coverage. Part III elaborates on how the legislative schemes 
function in relation to SUD coverage. Part IV concludes by proposing legislative modifications to 
existing health insurance law relating to SUD coverage.   
I. A Scientific Examination of SUD 
 
In order to understand public policy surrounding healthcare for SUD, it is imperative to 
understand the neurobiology of the disorder.  The first point to understand is the three stages of 
the addiction cycle and how they are carried out within the brain. The other vital point to examine 
is how genetic factors and comorbidity of other neurological disorders relate to SUD.  
a. Three stages of substance use 
SUD involves three stages of use, each associated with a different region of the brain:  
intoxication, withdrawal, and preoccupation. 12 The first of the three stages is the intoxication 
stage, which involves chemical changes in the basal ganglia. 13 The intoxication stage is the point 
in time where the individual consumes the intoxicating substance and it produces a pleasurable 
effect by means of releasing neurotransmitters in the brain at higher rates than normal. 14 The main 
neurotransmitter involved in SUD is dopamine, which is activated in our brain naturally when 
something good happens to serve as a reward system for our mind. 15 While the use of the substance 
can activate dopamine and, in the use of substances such as opioids and alcohol, our opioid 
systems, it also conditions the mind to desire to use the substance in the future. 16 This desire to 
continue usage in the future occurs because the brain releases smaller amounts of dopamine due 
to stimuli related to drug use and thus activates the reward-seeking mentality in the individual 
causing them to seek out that substance again.17 This phenomena is referred to by neurologists as 
 
12 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S 
REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 2-6 (U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. Eds., 2016) 
13 Id. at 2-8 
14 Id. at 2-9 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 2-10 
17 Ann E. Kelley & Kent C. Berridge, The Neuroscience of Natural Rewards, 22 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 9, (May 1, 
2002), https://www.jneurosci.org/content/22/9/3306.short 
incentive salience and is seen as a primary force behind the habitual and compulsive behavior 
involved in SUD.18 
The second stage of substance use is referred to as the withdrawal stage and involves the 
extended amygdala as well as the basal ganglia.19 The withdrawal stage is a two-part process which 
occurs in response to removing the substance from use causing chemical reactions in the brain due 
to the change in behavior.20 The first cause of the withdrawal phase is the detrimental effect of 
continued substance use on the dopamine receptors in the brain as they respond to natural stimuli.21 
Through the use of neuroimaging technology, such as fMRI scans, researchers have found that the 
dopamine system in substance users becomes less sensitive to stimuli and thus releases smaller 
amounts of dopamine than in non-users.22 This lower sensitivity pairs with the second process, 
release of neurotransmitters linked to stress in the extended amygdala, to drive the individual to 
continue use of substances in seeking pleasure.23 The release of neurotransmitters such as 
norepinephrine, dynorphin and corticotropin-releasing factor, lead to intense negative feelings of 
stress in the absence of the substance.24 In an effort to reduce these feelings, the individual is 
motivated to seek out the substance.25  
Opioid withdrawal produces a particularly harsh physical response to cease use due to changes 
in the locus cereuleus’ production of the chemical noradrenaline.26 The brain produces more 
noradrenaline, which controls functions associated with alertness including breathing and blood 
 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 2-13 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 2-14 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence: Implications for Treatment, SCI. 
& PRAC PERSP., July 2002, at 13 
pressure, in an attempt to counteract the impact of opioids in reducing blood pressure and 
respiration rates.27 When the individual ceases use of opioids, the brain continues to overproduce 
noradrenaline, which causes withdrawal symptoms, such as heightened anxiety and cramps.28 In 
many instances the individual seeks out the substance and relapses in an effort to prevent 
withdrawal symptoms. 
The third stage of the process is the preoccupation stage, during which individuals seek 
substances out after extended periods of sobriety. 29 The theory behind the preoccupation stage is 
that the prefrontal cortex of an individual with a history of substance use is conditioned in its cue 
activity to desire substances based on stimuli it associates with that substance.30 This leads to the 
related stimuli causing a similar, yet reduced, reaction in the prefrontal cortex activity as substance 
use.31 This effect can be seen in people who have an established history of cocaine use when they 
observe a video containing images of cocaine use, which triggers a neural cue in the decision-
making prefrontal cortex to seek out the substance.32  
b. Genetics of SUD 
The neurological impact of substance use is well established, but research leaves open the 
question of why certain individuals are more likely to use substances in the first instance. In 
addition, it is unknown why certain individuals develop SUD after using a substance and others 
do not. This is where it is useful to understand the role that genetics play in SUD. Genetic factors 
contribute to between 40% and 70% of risk differences that pertain to SUD.33 One main genetic 
 
27 Id. at 15 
28 Id. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., Supra note 12, at 2-15 
30 Rita Z. Goldstein & Nora D. Volkow, Dysfunction of the Prefrontal Cortex in Addiction: Neuroimaging Findings 
and Clinical Implications, NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE, (Oct. 20, 2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3462342/ 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., Supra note 6, at 2-22 
factor which impacts susceptibility to SUD is an abnormal prefrontal cortex as it relates to emotion 
control and impulsivity as along with other biological factors such as the metabolism of 
substances.34 The other prevalent genetic factor linked to SUD is the comorbidity of other 
neurological disorders. 35 
The first area where genetics play a role in SUD is the genetic makeup of the neurological 
functions surrounding the effects of substance use.36 This aspect of genetic predisposition to SUD 
is called the cognitive deficits model.37 This theory heavily focuses on the prefrontal cortex, which 
is the brain area that controls executive functions and allows individuals to make decisions in the 
interest of long-term impacts despite contrary impulses.38  
The cognitive deficits theory posits that SUD is more prevalent in individuals with prefrontal 
cortexes that fail to adequately signal to the mesolimbic reward system because those individuals 
are less likely to have control over their impulses.39 Studies have shown that this existing issue 
with the prefrontal cortex is then exasperated by the substance use.40 This occurs because 
stimulants have been demonstrated as impacting the part of the brain responsible for 
communicating between the prefrontal cortex and the reward system.41 Alternatively, opioid use 
damages the prefrontal cortex and compounds the preexisting problems.42 Genetic predispositions 
to substance use support the notion that SUD should be viewed by the law as a health condition, 
with policy that comports accordingly. 
 
34 Goldstein & Volkow, supra note 30 
35 Id. 
36 Kosten & George, supra note 26, at 16 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
The other major genetic factor in SUD is the existence of co-occurring neurological 
disorders.43 The co-occurrence of mental illness with SUD is a serious issue as survey data 
demonstrates that, out of the 9.7 million adults aged 26 to 49 who had SUD in 2018, 5 million also 
suffered from a mental illness (of any level of seriousness).44 3.2 million or 1.3% of adults aged 
18 or older have been diagnosed with both a serious mental illness and SUD.45 Neurological 
disorders that are often co-morbid with SUD include schizophrenia, which presents a “3- to 4-fold 
higher rate of tobacco smoking” indicating higher susceptibility to habitual substance use.46 PTSD 
also demonstrates co-morbidity as between 30 to 60 percent of people seeking treatment for 
alcohol abuse demonstrate signs of PTSD.47 This data has led researchers, who focus on the genetic 
conditions of individuals who exhibit signs of both mental illness and SUD, to better understand 
disease co-morbidity of the two. Such clinicians have discovered that conditions such as ADHD 
and mood disorders have a higher rate of co-morbidity with SUD.48 While the reasons for such 
high comorbidity rates are still being examined, the correlation is definite. 
 As demonstrated by the neurobiology of SUD, SUD is an issue that extends well beyond 
mere choice, but rather is a biological disorder. It is imperative that SUD be viewed by lawmakers 
as a biological disorder in the course of setting public policy related to SUD healthcare services. 
The view of SUD as a lifestyle choice limited to a certain class of individuals is misguided as SUD 
impacts an estimated 11 million full-time workers in the United States. 49 For example, take John 
 
43 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH at 46 (2018) 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., Supra note 12, at 2-22 – 2-23 
47 Id. 
48 Nora D. Volkow & Maximilian Muenke, The Genetics of Addiction, HUM. GENETICS, (June 2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4101188 
49 Recovery Unplugged, The Impact of Substance Use Disorder on Professionals and Their Employers, 
CORPORATE WELLNESS, https://www.corporatewellnessmagazine.com/article/the-impact-of-substance-use-
disorder-on-professionals-and-their-employers (last accessed Dec. 12, 2019) 
Doe who, although diagnosed with ADHD, led an average life and exceled professionally until his 
involvement in a serious car accident. As a result of his accident, John’s doctor prescribed him 
opioid-based painkillers. Due to the ability of the opioids in reducing his physical pain and 
psychological stress resulting from the trauma of the accident, he continued to use opioids past the 
end of his prescription. John developed a dependency on the opioids to self-treat his undiagnosed 
PTSD resulting from the incident. It is against this background of biological considerations that 
public policy must be developed. 
II. Legal History of SUD Healthcare Policy 
The issues caused by SUD have not been completely overlooked by American lawmakers as 
there have been several legislative actions directed towards addressing the issue since the 1990s. 
However, these legislative policies stop short of ensuring health services for all people who have 
a SUD. Perhaps the largest outstanding issue regarding SUD treatment that needs to be addressed 
is the ongoing disparity between pertinent private and public healthcare laws and policies. This 
section examines the history of statutory treatment of SUD. This examination will focus on statutes 
which regulate the provision of SUD services within private health insurance plans as well as the 
treatment of SUD in SSDI.  
a. Mental health and substance use disorder parity in private insurance 
Policies regarding mental health parity in private health insurance  were first introduced 
with the enactment of the Mental Health Parity Act in 1996 by President Bill Clinton. 50 This bill 
was important because, while it neglected to address SUD, it was the first federal statute that 
addressed the issues of discriminatory health insurance treatment for mental health conditions and 
disorders.51 Prior to the enactment of the statute, employers had been hesitant to offer parity 
 
50 Flood, supra note 4, at 368 
51 Id. 
between physical injury coverage and mental health coverage due to the belief that such parity 
would increase costs.52 The increase in neurological research and access to cheaper and more 
effective means of treatment led to the push for parity.53 The Mental Health Parity Act required 
employers with more than fifty employees to provide parity between physical and mental health 
benefits in lifetime and annual limits.54 While this legislation was a step in the right direction 
towards requiring parity in health insurance, it neglected to tackle the issue of SUD which was not 
addressed until Representative Marge Roukema of New Jersey proposed amendments to the act to 
expand the parity benefits to SUD treatment.55  
The real change in legislative policy regarding SUD would come on  October 3, 2008 when 
President George W. Bush signed the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) into law.56 The MHPAEA modified pre-existing parity 
legislation by expanding  its coverage to SUD and increased the reach of parity.57 The act required 
equal treatment of mental health and SUD coverage in terms of number of visits, cost sharing and 
access to in- and out-of-network services.58 This provided a huge benefit for those working in large 
companies by granting them easier access to SUD resources.59 The downside is that it did little for 
those with mental health and SUD issues working in small businesses or who received health 
insurance by means of individual plans.  
 
52 Id. at 367 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of Expansive Mental Health 
Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 21 (2000) 
56 Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 179, 182 (2013) 
57 Flood, supra note 4, at 370 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
The issue of expanding mental health and SUD parity beyond large companies came as a 
piece of a much larger law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA was 
signed into law by President Barrack Obama on March 23, 2010.60 The ACA made many changes 
in the structure of health insurance law, but the most pertinent change for parity came in the form 
of implementing coverage mandates that imposed a tax penalty for those who did not carry a 
minimum health insurance plan either through their employer, a state-funded plan or individual 
plans.61 Additionally, the ACA established a requirement that plans which were not grandfathered 
by the act be required to provide Essential Health Benefits (EHB) which includes SUD treatment.62 
The details of how this legislation functions in the private health insurance field will be discussed 
in section III of this paper. 
b. Legal history of SUD in SSDI 
The CAAA was hugely detrimental to securing adequate treatment for many suffering SUD 
resulting in a 52.4% decrease in Americans with a SUD who were eligible for SSDI upon 
enactment.63 The CAAA was enacted in 1996 and contained a provision which prevented the term 
“Disability” as understood in the context of SSDI from being extended to those who had a SUD 
which is “material” to their disability.64 A SUD is considered material to the disability in the event 
that the co-occurring disability would not be severe enough to qualify for SSDI without the 
existence of the SUD.65 In many judicial circuits this causes evidentiary hurdles for claimants of 
 
60 Id. at 372 
61 Id. at 374 
62 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-77) 
63 See Selver, supra note 11, at 958 
64 Mazin A. Sbaiti, Administrative Oversight? Towards a Meaningful “Materiality” Determination Process for 
Dual-Diagnosis Claimants Seeking Disability Benefits Under Titles II & XVI of the Social Security Act, 35 COLUM. 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 415, 416 (2004) 
65 Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use 
Disorder Benefits, 38 AM. J. L. AND MED. 471, 483 (2012) 
SSDI as the burden is placed upon them to bifurcate the co-occurring conditions.66 This act resulted 
in the inability of those suffering with SUD from receiving SSDI to aid in seeking and paying for 
treatment of their disorder. While the passage of this act preceded the extension of SUD parity 
established by the MHPAEA and extended by the ACA, it continues to exist today despite the 
policy considerations favoring the provision of treatment to those with SUD evident in the ACA 
and MHPAEA. The mechanics of how this statute functions in determining whether an individual 
is able to secure SSDI is further examined in Part III below. 
III. Legal Analysis of Health Care Policy Relating to SUD 
The passage of legislation regulating the provision of private healthcare, such as the MHPAEA 
and the ACA, have made huge strides towards providing those with SUD the care that they need, 
but how is this accomplished and to what extent? To answer these questions requires an in-depth 
analysis of those law’s statutory frameworks as well as an examination of what they fail to cover. 
Additionally, it is necessary to examine how unemployed and otherwise uninsured individuals are 
treated under laws such as the COBRA as well as SSDI after the passage of the CAAA.  
a. SUD parity under the MHPAEA 
The MHPAEA mandated SUD parity in relation to the benefits in those plans provided for 
physical health conditions for employers with more than fifty employees.67 While the scope of this 
act was limited to large employers, it was also relatively toothless because it did not mandate any 
coverage at all for mental health issues or SUD as parity was only required in instances where any 
level of coverage was offered for mental health and SUD.68 Furthermore, the act provided an 
exemption from its parity requirements if the insurer could demonstrate parity would result in a 
 
66 See Selver, supra note 11, at 967-970 
67 Tovino, supra note 65, at 483 
68 Id. 
two percent or more increase in cost in the first year and one percent increase in following years.69 
With these limitations, millions of Americans who were not employed by large employers, whose 
employer offered no form of coverage for mental health or SUD, and whose insurers could 
demonstrate an increase in cost, were  precluded from realizing SUD parity. As this relates to the 
example of John Doe, since he was working for a small business of less than fifty employees when 
he developed his PTSD and opioid use disorder, his employer health insurance plan through his 
employer would not be required to offer equal coverage to him if he sought treatment for his post-
accident issues.  
The reach of the MHPAEA was certainly less than satisfactory, but its provisions 
surrounding parity, were theoretically beneficial for setting a framework for SUD parity. The act 
enhanced coverage for SUD by preventing large group health plans from providing disparate 
coverage for SUD treatment by placing strict financial limits such as annual and lifetime spending 
on treatment for mental health and SUD.70  Treatment equality was another consideration of the 
act as it provided insured individuals equal application of necessity determinations as well as 
provider access for those seeking mental health and SUD care to the quality of treatment needed 
to alleviate their issues.71 The financial and treatment equality standards apply under MHPAEA to 
six categories: (1) inpatient in-network care, (2) inpatient out-of-network care, (3) outpatient in-
network care, (4) outpatient out-of-network care, (5) prescription drugs and (6) emergency care.72 
In determining whether parity exists the limitation, service, and network involved are compared to 
physical benefits under the same circumstances.73  
 
69 Id. 
70 Weber, supra note 56, at 183 
71 Id. at 184 
72 Id. at 211 
73 Id. at 212 
The parity requirements under the MHPAEA are certainly favorable for ensuring equal 
coverage for those suffering from mental health disorders or SUD. For instance, in the event that 
John Doe’s employer was actually a large employer, and required to offer equal coverage for 
mental health and SUD, then Doe would not be required to pay a larger copayment when seeking 
treatment for his post-accident issues. He also would not have to worry about whether his 
cumulative cost of treatment exceeds an arbitrary and lesser annual cap than if he sought treatment 
for physical injuries received in the same accident. However, since John worked for a small 
business, his employer would not be required to provide parity under the MHPAEA. 
b. ACA Health Care Reform  
i. ACA expansion of coverage 
The biggest criticism of the MHPAEA is its limited reach to large employer groups. The 
ACA partially remedied this issue by expanding parity to a significantly larger group of insureds 
by means of its shared responsibility provision, which requires a significant portion of Americans 
to have health insurance.74 This ACA’s shared responsibility provision imposes a penalty on 
individuals who do not receive “minimum essential coverage” under a government-sponsored 
plan, an employer-sponsored plan, individual plans, grandfathered health plans or coverage 
otherwise recognized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.75  The ACA exempts from 
this penalty for certain classes of individuals.76 The most pertinent exemptions for SUD concerns 
are the incarcerated, those whose contributions would represent more than eight percent of their 
household income and those whose household income is below the filing threshold for federal 
 
74 Flood, supra note 4, at 373 
75 26 U.S.C.S. §5000A (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-77) 
76 Id. 
income taxes.77 While this mandate has led to a large increase in the number of insured Americans, 
there were still 27.5 million Americans who did not have health insurance in 2018.78 
The ACA’s shared responsibility provision also extended to Large Employer Groups 
(LEGs).  This provision required that LEGs, which are employers with more than fifty full-time 
employees, to provide minimum essential coverage for their full-time employees. 79 While this 
expanded the requirements for health insurance significantly, it failed to reach Small Employer 
Groups (SEGs) which account for 96% of employers.80 This exception for SEGs leaves a large 
gap in employer provided health care. The exception forces individuals employed by SEGs who 
do not provide health insurance to seek out alternative forms of essential minimum coverage in 
order to avoid penalties under the individual portion of the shared responsibility provision. John 
Doe is employed by a small business with less than 20 employees and would not be guaranteed 
health insurance provided by his employer. Assuming that John makes enough income to have to 
file federal income taxes each year he would suffer a penalty if he did not seek out health insurance 
on the individual market or from another source. This penalty would apply so long as his 
contribution to the insurance was less than 8% of his annual household income. John’s employer 
did in fact provide health insurance coverage, so John does not meet the exemptions. 
ii. ACA and the expansion of covered services 
While the ACA’s expansion of coverage was a huge difference maker, the real force of the 
ACA is its Essential Health Benefits (EHB) requirement, whch is inclusive of ten categories of 
benefits, including SUD services.81 In addition to the EHB requirement, SUD parity is ensured in 
 
77 Id. 
78 EDWARD R. BERCHICK ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018 (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-267.html 
79 26 U.S.C. §§4980H (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-77) 
80 Flood, supra note 4, at 380 
81 Id. at 381-382 
qualified health plans by expanding the application of the MHPAEA from LEGs to all qualified 
health plans.82 These two changes were monumental in expanding access to SUD services for 
individuals, but there are still areas where the EHB requirement does not reach. 
The EHB requirement extends to individual and SEG plans that are neither grandfathered 
nor self-funded.83 An ACA grandfathered plan includes health plans in which individuals or SEGs 
were enrolled on or before March 23, 2010.84 While this may lead to some individuals not receiving 
the EHB services required of non-grandfathered plans, it is actually in the insurance providers’ 
interests to utilize non-grandfathered plans so they can adapt the plans to current market 
conditions.85 While the SEG grandfathered plans will reduce in number over the years due to the 
need to significantly alter the mechanics of the plans to keep up with changes in premiums and 
other considerations, there remains the issue of the self-funded plan exemption.86 Self-funded 
insurance plans are where the employer provides for the medical costs of employees out-of-pocket 
rather than by paying premiums to an insurance company.87  In order for non-exempt individual 
plans and SEG plans to meet the EHB requirement, they must meet the parity requirements 
provided under the MHPAEA.88 While the EHB requirement does not extend to LEG plans, the 
LEGs who offer any form of mental health and SUD services are still bound by the parity 
requirements of the MHPAEA.89 What this means for poor old John Doe is that since the small 
business which he works for utilizes a self-funded health insurance plan, his employer is not bound 
 
82 42 U.S.C.A. 18031(j) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-77) 
83 Flood, supra note 4, at 385 
84 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a) (LEXIS through Dec. 9, 2019 issue of Federal Register) 
85 Flood, supra note 4, at 384 
86 Id. at 385-386 
87 Id. at 387 
88 45 C.F.R § 156.115(a)(3) (LEXIS through Dec. 9, 2019 issue of the Federal Register) 
89 Flood, supra note 4, at 390 
by the EHB requirements or the parity requirements of the MHPAEA and thus does not have to 
afford him equal coverage of his PTSD or SUD following his automobile accident. 
c. Extension and lack thereof of SUD coverage under COBRA 
The next potential source of uninsured Americans with SUD comes from an examination 
of individuals who were covered under an employer-based insurance plan and is terminated from 
employment. This area of health insurance law is addressed by COBRA. COBRA mandates that a 
plan must continue coverage of an individual who would lose coverage due to a “qualifying 
event”.90 The coverage required for the duration of the continuation must be coverage identical to 
the coverage provided at the time of the qualifying event (i.e. termination of employment).91 This 
means that after being fired, the same insurance plan must apply as applied during employment. It 
can be provided for a continued premium not to exceed 102 percent of the premium at the time of 
the qualifying event and continue for a duration of 18 months.92 COBRA qualifying events include 
termination from employment for any reason other than “gross misconduct”.93 It is important to 
note that this continuation of coverage applies to self-insured plans, and includes a specialized 
determination of the applicable premium to be used in determining premiums for continuation.94  
One of the glaring issues with COBRA as it relates to SUD is the lack of clarity in analyzing 
whether a person being terminated from their position for their substance use outside of the 
workplace is considered “gross misconduct”. In the absence of clear authority governing the use 
of intoxicating substances outside of the workplace a view of analogous law must be utilized. The 
analysis of how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) views the use of substances provides 
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some guidance but is far from concrete. Under the ADA, employer policy enforcing employee 
compliance with federal laws and regulations related to drug and alcohol use is acceptable.95 This 
allows employers to fire an employee with SUD who is currently using illegal drugs regardless of 
if they are considered as having a disability.96  The notion of legal compliance is one which appears 
reasonable, but causes has the consequence of discriminating against SUD under an area of law 
designed to counter discrimination. 
There is another analogous area of law under which clarity on whether SUD qualifies as 
“gross misconduct” is provided is the Service-Connected Disability Compensation Program for 
Veterans.97 Under veteran service-related disability programs compensation is only granted for 
disabilities which do not stem from “willful misconduct”, SUD or alcoholism.98 The pairing of 
“willful misconduct” with SUD and alcoholism in the law surrounding veteran benefit appears to 
link the group with a common thread and suggest that SUD is a form of misconduct.  
Taking this into consideration, the “gross misconduct” exception to continued coverage 
under COBRA is likely to extend to termination for illegal drug use outside the workplace by an 
employee, even if that employee has SUD. This means that John Doe, if fired because his boss 
finds in a drug test that he has been using unprescribed opioids, could be terminated for “gross 
misconduct” and unable to elect for continued coverage under the employer’s plan.  
d. SUD discrimination in SSDI post-CAAA 
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The analysis of whether an individual is eligible for SSDI relies upon the determination 
that the individual is “disabled” according to the statute.99 This determination of an individual’s 
“disability” is based on a five-step sequential evaluation.100  
The first step of the analysis examines whether the applicant is currently engaged in work 
which is considered “substantial gainful activity”.101 In the event that the claimant is engaged in 
such activity, then the Social Security Administration (SSA) will conclude that the claimant is not 
“disabled” and terminate the claim for SSDI.102 The SSA considers such matters as whether the 
work performed by the claimant is for monetary compensation, requires physical or mental 
activities and whether the worker can complete the work in an independent manner similarly to 
others in the same or similar positions.103 
The second step in the analysis is determining whether the claimant has a medical 
impairment that is significant enough to limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic activities.104 
This factor in particular is of interest in cases such as that of John Doe as it lists a series of nine 
categorical mental conditions which are considered to be severe medical impairments, but SUD is 
excluded from that list.105 In the event that the claimant is discovered as not having a severe 
medical impairment, the SSA will not approve the claim.106 
The third step in the determination process is a consideration of whether the medical 
condition of the applicant is included on the SSA’s list of disabilities.107 If a condition is not 
expressly listed, but is considered by the SSA to be of equivalent impairment, then the claim may 
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be approved.108 If this factor of the test is satisfactorily met by the claimant, then the analysis 
concludes, with the exception of the SUD consideration added by the CAAA.109 If this factor is 
not satisfactorily met, then the analysis continues to the next stage.110 
The fourth stage of the analysis is to determine whether the claimant’s medical impairment 
prevents the claimant from engaging in the same manner of work as the claimant was engaged in 
during the past fifteen years.111 If the conclusion is that the applicant is unable to continue work in 
such similar fields the analysis continues to the final step.112 
The final stage is for the SSA to analyze the potential for the claimant to seek out and 
perform other types of meaningful work.113 This factor takes into consideration the characteristics 
of the claimant.114 Some traits the SSA will take into consideration for this determination include 
age, education, work experience, and ability.115 This stage is unique within the analysis as it 
requires the SSA bears the burden of demonstrating the claimant is capable of adjusting to 
alternative modes of work in order to deny the claim.116 
The CAAA amends the definition of disability in 42 U.S.C.S. 423(d) to make clear that an 
individual cannot be classified as disabled for purposes of SSDI in the event that alcoholism or 
drug addiction is a material factor to the disability determination.117 This amendment to the 
definition of disability for purposes of obtaining SSDI was incredibly detrimental to alleviating 
the burden of SUD in America.118 The materiality provision effectively prevented 60% of SSI and 
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SSDI recipients with SUD from requalifying between the enactment of the provision in 1996 and 
1999.119 This leaves individuals with severe impairments suffering co-occurring mental illness and 
SUD from being able to meet their burden of proving disability which prevents them from 
engaging in meaningful employment.  
This additional consideration in disability assessments is in stark contrast with the policy 
considerations which were catalysts for the reformation of private health insurance mental health 
and SUD parity demonstrated above. Regulations related to this provision state that, in making the 
materiality determination, the SSA will utilize medical evidence to make the decision of whether 
the disability would exist after removing the use of substances.120 In the event that a claimant with 
SUD can meet this burden, the law requires that any SSDI benefits they are entitled to tare collected 
on their behalf by a representative payee.121 The representative payee requirement is sensible in 
view of preventing misuse of benefits, but contributes yet another procedural hurdle for those 
already challenged with overcoming co-occurring disabilities. 
The impact on John Doe is devastating. After being terminated from his job, even if his 
inability to work is due to his PTSD, the co-existence of his SUD would be a huge impediment to 
his being able to secure SSDI. In several circuits, John would have the evidentiary burden of 
demonstrating that his PTSD was disabling enough without his SUD contributing in a material 
manner. Due to the fact that his SUD began in response to the same event that caused his PTSD, 
it would be highly unlikely that John would be able to separate the two enough to meet the heavy 
burden upon him as a claimant. In the event that John is able to meet his burden, he would need a 
representative payee to collect the payment on his behalf. 
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IV. Suggested Amendments to Legislation Surrounding SUD Services 
In reviewing the relevant legislation, it appears that there are several issues which prevent the 
adequate prevention and treatment of SUD in the provision of healthcare. Those issues include: 
(1) the lack of requirements for LEGs to provide any coverage of mental health and SUD under 
either the MHPAEA or the ACA, (2) the self-funded exception to the EHB requirement for SEGs, 
(3) the failure to require coverage from SEGs, (4) the lack of clarity in whether SUD involving the 
illegal use of drugs outside of the workplace falls under the gross misconduct exception to 
COBRA, and (5) the harsh effect of the material contribution analysis in determining a disability 
post-CAAA.  
Perhaps the most concerning of these obstacles is the disparity in policy between the 
reformations made to the regulation of SUD services in private healthcare and the CAAA 
amendment of disability to exclude material SUD. The disparity between the views of the policies 
guiding healthcare related to SUD displays a change in attitude based on temporal considerations 
surrounding SUD. If a person with SUD is employed, and their SUD is not discovered, they are 
provided more right to SUD health services. Once their SUD is discovered, they may be open to 
termination and the ensuing discriminatory impacts of COBRA and the CAAA identified above. 
The first change necessary to ensure the adequate provision of health services for SUD is to 
increase the breadth of the EHB requirement to apply LEGs. By expanding this requirement to the 
LEGs, it would ensure that not only is coverage expanded to more citizens, but also that those 
covered under such plans are receiving access to mental health and SUD services. A large portion 
of the estimated cost of SUD in America is due to lost productivity and absenteeism in the 
workplace as a result of SUD.122 If LEGs are required to provide services for SUD under the EHB 
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requirement then this number can be reduced. It would prevent companies that currently provide 
no coverage for mental health and SUD from future avoidance of parity for these vital health 
concerns. This solution is easily implemented by a simple amendment to the ACA. In 2010 and 
2011 it was found that 96% of LEGs already provided some level of SUD coverage to 
employees.123 This demonstrates that the change would not be a critically negative impact on 
industry while providing life-changing care for those employees suffering with SUD. 
The second necessary change is to eliminate the SEG self-funded exception to the EHB 
requirement. The implied policy consideration underlying the EHB requirement is to prioritize 
care for issues which are considered to be essential to the well-being of society. In order to more 
adequately meet this policy goal, there must be a means of holding self-funded SEGs accountable 
for providing essential services. In the absence of the EHB requirement, these SEGs could provide 
healthcare which is severely lacking in coverage which also allows those employees covered under 
the plan from being penalized and driven towards the individual market where EHB is required. 
Alternatively, if the employees are dissatisfied with the level of coverage provided by their 
employer they could be forced to seek plans on the individual market in order to obtain EHB 
coverage. This is a large loophole in the ACA that prevents many thousands of individuals to from 
access to mental health and SUD services necessary for their welfare. 
The third modification which is necessary to ensure proper coverage is to amend the ACA to 
require that SEGs provide health insurance for employee or, at the minimum, contribute to an 
individual plan in the form of a specified percentage of the paid premiums. Such an amendment 
would ensure that full-time employees receive aid in healthcare from their employers and are not 
left to fend for themselves in the individual plan marketplace. The national average deductible for 
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SEG plans is 31% lower than the deductible for individual plans.124 By forcing employees seeking 
EHB coverage to seek individual plans, the burden on the individual is multiplied.125 This would 
lead to more insured individuals in general since there are certainly individuals who take the 
penalty for being uninsured due to not having employer-provided health insurance and not wishing 
to pay significantly greater amounts for individual plans. 
The fourth amendment which is necessary is to shelter those with medically demonstrable SUD 
from COBRA’s gross misconduct exception for SUD which fails to impact their productivity. As 
is demonstrated by the neurological facts surrounding SUD, it is and should be viewed as a 
disability. In the event that an employee is terminated for use of illegal substances outside of the 
workplace, the law should state that if the out-of-work misconduct can be attributed to a covered 
condition, then continuing coverage is contingent upon a showing by the claimant that they are 
taking remedial action in the form of rehabilitative services. The duration of such services should 
be required to extend for the full period of the continuation. This would allow employees 
terminated for illegal use of substances outside of the workplace the ability to utilize any existing 
SUD services covered by their employer’s plan for rehabilitative purposes. This prevents the 
temporal disparity between providing rehabilitative services for SUD during employment and 
SUD services after termination. 
The final proposition for the construction of a truly comprehensive SUD policy is to alleviate 
the impact of the CAAA amendment on the definition of disability. An amendment should be made 
that there be an additional provision which allows for the approval of SSDI for an individual with 
material SUD in the event that: (1) the claimant demonstrates the existence of a genetic 
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predisposition to SUD either through genetic properties of their brain or the existence of a co-
occurring disability which heightens the rate of SUD, (2) the claimant utilizes a responsible payee 
pursuant to the current legislation, (3) the SSDI approval is conditioned on the demonstration by 
claimant that they are taking part in remedial action in the form of rehabilitative services, (4) the 
SSDI shall continue insofar as the claimant is disabled following the treatment of the SUD, and 
(5) that SSDI benefits shall be terminated after an eighteen-month safe harbor period following 
approval upon showing of SUD materiality by the SSA. The most important aspect of this proposal 
is the introduction of a safe harbor provision allowing the claimant time to mitigate the impact of 
SUD on the disability determination. This safe harbor is a middle ground between the CAAA’s 
non-existent safe harbor which replaced the thirty-six month safe harbor in the Social Security 
Independence and Program Improvement Act of 1994.126 This proposed change will allow those 
who have co-occurring conditions such as John Doe’s PTSD and opioid use disorder the 
opportunity to utilize SSDI while taking remedial action. This allows time to gather evidence of 
exactly how material the SUD is to the overall disability without relying on the SSA’s own 
speculative judgement of the disability. 
In conclusion, while recent legislation has demonstrated a strong stance of treating SUD 
according to the neurobiological facts known about the condition, there remains work to be done 
to fight the great American crisis that is SUD. There still remains a temporal disparity in how SUD 
is viewed in healthcare law. If an individual had previous SUD in the past the law appears to 
welcome the provision of services. In the same vein, prophylaxis garners preferential legal 
consideration over treatment. If the SUD has just begun or is currently in progress, the law appears 
to shun the individual. With each passing day another victim in the war on drug-users slips through 
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the legal cracks into an early grave. The law should be used as a medium for implementing positive 
societal change rather than as a shackle upon the necks of those already imprisoned within the 
confines of substance abuse.  
